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CRIMIINAL PROCEDURE-INTERSTATE EXTRADICTION-SCOPE OF REvImW ON
HABEAS CoRPUs-[Missouri].-The relator, charged with the commission of
robbery in Adams County, Illinois, on June 22, 1930, was taken in custody
on the warrant of the Governor of Missouri, issued upon the requisition of
the Governor of Illinois. The relator brings habeas corpus to effect his
release, contending that the Governor of Missouri had wrongly considered
evidence to show commission of the alleged crime on a different date from
that originally charged. Held: The question of jurisdiction to issue the
warrant is the only question subject to judicial review.1 Hence the relator
was remanded to custody.
Interstate extradition is not dependent on comity, courtesy or contract, 2
but is governed by the Federal Constitution3 and statutes 4. The method de-
vised is essentially one of the executive demand and executive surrender,
with an unenforceable duty resting on the surrendering executive.0 The gov-
ernor of one state is authorized to honor the requisition made on him by
the governor of another state7 when the following jurisdictional grounds
exist: (1) That the accused has been formally charged with a crime in
the demanding state; (2) that he has fled therefrom.8 Whether there has
been a sufficient charge of the crime is a question of law; whether the ac-
cused is a fugitive from justice is a question of fact.9
1. Williams v. Robertson, agent of State of Illinois, 95 S. W. (2d) 79
(Mo. 1936).
2. People v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 825, 92 Am. St. Rep. 706,
60 L. R. A. 774; Aff'd. 188 U. S. 691, 23 S. Ct. 456, 47 L. Ed. 657 (1903);
Rummerfield v. Watson, 335 Mo. 71, 70 S. W. (2d) 895 (1934); State v.
Westhues, 318 Mo. 928, 2 S. W. (2d) 612 (1928); Ex parte Montgomery,
244 Fed. 967 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1917) ; In re opinion of Justices, 201 Mass.
609 (1909).
3. U. S. Const., Art. 4, Sec. 2; Ex parte Mongomery, supra, note 2; State
v. Westhues, supra, note 2.
4. 1 Stat. 302 (1793), 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 662; For the historical back-
ground, see Hoague, Extradition between States (1879) 13 Am. L. Rev. 181;
R. S. Mo. 1929 sec. 1458 and R. S. Mo. 1929 sec. 3591 disclose on their face
that they are intended to be merely in aid of the federal law.
5. See Drucker, A Proposed Correction of the Illinois Statute to Facili-
tate Extradition (1931) 26 Ill. L. Rev. 168.
6. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How (U. S.) 66, 16 L. Ed. 717, where
it was said that mandamus will not lie to compel the executive to obey a
proper requisition.
7. See Ex parte Hogan, 245 S. W. 336 (Mo. 1922).
8. U. S. Const. Art. 4, sec. 2; 1 Stat. 302, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 662 (1793);
Keeton v. Gaiser, 331 Mo. 499, 55 S. W. (2d) 302 (1932) ; Ex parte Morgan,
20 Fed. 298 (D. C. W. D. Ark., 1883); Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980
(C. C. A. 6, 1905; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 S. Ct. 291, 29 L. ed.
544 (1885). The proposition has been variously stated, See Munsey v.
Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 L. ed. 515 (1905) ; Rummerfield v.
Watson, supra, note 2; Commonwealth v. Supt. of County Prison, 220 Pa.
401, 69 A. 916, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 939 (1908). If either fact is wanting,
then the governor is without authority to honor the requisition, Roberts
v. Reilly, supra; State v. Westhues, supra, note 2; Ex parte Spears, 88 Cal.
640, 26 Pac. 608, 22 Am. St. Rep. 341 (1891) ; State v. Wellman, 102 Kan.
503, 170 Pac. 1052 (1918).
9. Ex parte Brown, 259 Pac. 280, (Okla. 1927) ; Keeton v. Gaiser, supra,
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The problem arises of whether the courts in habeas corpus proceedings
may question the executives' determination of the above questions.' 0 The
sufficiency of the indictment is a matter of technical pleading to be deter-
minded by the laws of the demanding state, and not a matter for review
on habeas corpus. 1 However the courts do not hesitate to review and re-
verse the executive conclusion for manifest error.12 The more difficult ques-
tion is whether the accused was in the demanding state at the time specified
and hence became a fugitive from justice when he left- it.'3 The courts
agree that bodily presence is essential and that constructive presence is not
sufficient, since a person cannot be said to have fled from a place in which
he never was.' 4 When the executive of the asylum state has determined that
the accused is a fugitive from justice, the propriety of reviewing his con-
clusion has been the subject of much controversy. 5 A few cases deny any
inquiry.16 This holding is obviously objectionable since it would permit the
executive to abuse legal process. 17 At the other extreme is the view that,
the relator need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he
is not a fugitive from justice.'5 This "weight of the evidence" position is
said to ignore the proposition that a writ of habeas corpus may not be used
note 8; Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 41 S. Ct. 222, 65 L. ed. 497 (1921);
Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 27 S. Ct. 122, 51 L. ed. 161, 7
Ann. Cas. 1073 (1906); People v. Hyatt, supra, note 2. No other questions
can be raised or considered on appeal. See People ex rel Witfield v. Enright,
117 Misc. Rep. 448, 191 N. Y. S. 491 (1921).
10. This involves somewhat the nature of the acts of the governor of
the Asylum State. Generally the courts have said his duty is ministerial,
without the power to exercise executive or judicial discretion. But some
have stated that he acts judicially also. See State ex rel Redwine v. Sel-
man, 12 S. W. (2d) 368 (Tenn. 1928).
11. Ex parte Regel, 114 U. S. 642, 55 S. Ct. 1148, 29 L. ed. 250 (1805).
Pierce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311, 15 S. Ct. 116, 39 L. ed. 164 (1894).
12. People ex rel Lawrence v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 (1874) ; People ex rel
Jourdan v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 438 (1881); State ex rel Stundahl v. Richard-
son, 34 Minn. 115, 24 N. W. 354 (1885). The law of the demanding state
of course furnishes the test. In re Veasey, 146 S. E. 599 (N. C. 1929). Mo-
tive underlying the institution of prosecution in the demanding state cannot
be considered by the court. State v. Westhues, supra, note 2.
13. Keeton v. Gaiser, supra, note 8.
14. Ex parte Regel, supra, note 11; Keller v. Butler 246 N. Y. 249, 158
N. E. 510 (1927) ; In re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503 (1883) ; State v. Hall, 115 N. C.
811, 20 S. E. 729, (1894).
15. Roberts 7. Reilly, supra, note 8; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, supra,
note 9. See also Levitt, Judicial Review of Executive Acts (1925) 23 Mich.
L. Rev. 588.
16. People ex rel Ryan v. Conlin, 15 Misc. Rep. 303, 36 N. Y. Supp. 888
(1895). See Beddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U. S. 128, 38 S. Ct.
41, 62 L. ed. 193 (1917); Grace v. Dogan, 117 So. 596 (Miss. 1928); Ex
parte Edwards, 91 Miss. 621, 44 So. 827 (1907).
17. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111, 51 L. ed. 148, 7 Am.
Cas. 1047 (1906); In re Moore, 75 Fed. 8 21, (D. C. D. Oregon, 1896).
18. In re Veasey, 146 S. E. 599 (N. C. 1929); Commonwealth v. Supt. of
County Prison, supra, note 8; State v. Adams, 192 N. C. 787, 136 S. E. 116
(1926).
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taken in the great majority of jurisdictions where it is held that the con-
clusion of the governor must stand unless clearly erroneous. 20 This holding
seems to be eminently fair and sensible, allowing the court to rectify obvious
mistakes and review cases involving bad faith, but at the same time attach-
ing due weight to the executives' determinations.
In the instant case there was evidence that the date of the alleged crime
was at a different time than that charged in the indictment. Since this evi-
dence was satisfactory to the governor and his action not contrary to law,
the court very properly refused to reverse his decision.
J. L. A.
EMINENT DOMAIN - TITLE AND RIGHT OF POSSESSION BEFORE ACTUAL
COPENSATION-[Federal].-In the recent case of Hessel v. A. Smith & Co.1
a landowner sought an injunction to restrain a contractor from proceeding
to erect a government building, on the ground that the statute under which
the land had been acquired from the plaintiff was unconstitutional. The
statute,2 which provided that in proceedings by the United States to con-
demn land, the title and right of possession should vest in the United States
on the filing of a "Declaration of Taking" and the deposit in court of the
amount of estimated compensation, was held constitutional against the claim
that it violated the 5th Amendment.
It is well settled that the government may constitutionally take posses-
sion of privately-owned land prior to conclusion of condemnation proceed-
ings, even in the absence of express statutory authority, provided adequate
provision is made for ultimate payment of just compensation to the land-
owner.3 The procedure approved by the court in the earlier cases, however,
has been criticized as not adequately protecting the rights of the property
owner.
The mere right to have the compensation judicially determined subse-
quently to the taking with the ultimate award insured by the pledge of
to fulfill the functions of an appeal or writ of error.'0 A middle ground is
19. People v. Hazard, 361 Ill. 60, 196 N. E. 827 (1935) ; In re Halderman,
119 A. 735 (Pa. 1923) ; In re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 13 S. Ct. 793 (1893).
Habeas Corpus is not the proper proceeding to try the question as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Munsey v. Clough, supra, note 8; State
ex rel Cooney v. Hoffmeister, 80 S. W. (2d) 195 (Mo. 1935).
20. Munsey v. Clough, supra, note 8; Hogan v. O'Neill, supra, note 9;
Keeton v. Gaiser, supra, note 8. Governor's determination as to the suffi-
ciency of the sworn evidence that the party charged is a fugitive from jus-
tice is subject to judicial review. Drumm v. Penderson et al., 259 N. W. 208(Iowa 1935).
1. 3 U. S. Law Week 1201 (D. C. E. D. Ill., June 30, 1936).
2. 46 Stat. 1421, 40 U. S. C. A. sec. 258 (1931).
3. Cherokee Nation v. The Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 10
S. Ct. 965, 34 L. ed. 295 (1890); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 40 S. Ct..
63, 64 L. ed. 135 (1919); in re Condemnation for Improvement of Rouge
River, 266 Fed. 105 (D. C. Mich., 1920); Backus v. Fort Street Union De-
pot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 18 S. Ct. 445, 42 L. ed. 853 (1897).
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